Friday, 10 January 2014

Aristotle, Hegel and Lenin on Truth

Now it is also the case that there can be nothing intermediate to an assertion and a denial. We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject. The quickest way to show this is by defining truth and falsity. Well, falsity is the assertion that that which is is not or that that which is not is and truth is the assertion that that which is is and that that which is not is not. Thus anyone who asserts anything to be or not to be is either telling the truth or telling a falsehood. On the other hand, neither that which is is said either not to be or to be nor is that which is not.

And if there were an intermediate of contradictory statements, then it would either be like grey between black and white or like the non-man-non-horse between man and horse.
Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Trans and Introduction by Hugh Lawson-Tancred, Penguin, London, 2004, 107 (Gamma 7 1011b)

* * *

It is admitted that the law of identity expresses only a one-sided determinateness, that it contains only formal truth, a truth which is abstract, incomplete. In this correct judgement, however, it is immediately implied that truth is complete only in the unity of identity with difference, and hence consists only in this unity.
G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, Trans., A.V. Miller, Humanities Press, New York, 1976, 414

the truth is concrete; that is, while it gives a bond and principle of unity, it also possesses an internal source of development
G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Logic, Trans., William Wallace, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1975, 19-20

For what subject matter can cognition have that is more sublime than truth itself!
G.W.F. Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, Trans., A.V. Miller, Humanities Press, New York, 1976, 575

* * *

Contemporary fideism does not at all reject science; all it rejects is the “exaggerated claims” of science, to wit, its claim to objective truth. If objective truth exists (as the materialists think), if natural science, reflecting the outer world in human “experience”, is alone capable of giving us objective truth, then all fideism is absolutely refuted. But if there is no objective truth, if truth (including scientific truth) is only an organising form of human experience, then this in itself is an admission of the fundamental premise of clericalism, the door is thrown open for it, and a place is cleared for the “organising forms” of religious experience.
V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy, 1908, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, 110

Dialectics—as Hegel in his time explained—contains an element of relativism, of negation, of scepticism, but is not reducible to relativism. The materialist dialectics of Marx and Engels certainly does contain relativism, but is not reducible to relativism, that is, it recognises the relativity of all our knowledge, not in the sense of denying objective truth, but in the sense that the limits of approximation of our knowledge to this truth are historically conditional.
V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy, 1908, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, 121

The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge. And it inevitably leads to materialism, sweeping aside the endless fabrications of professorial scholasticism. Of course, we must not forget that the criterion of practice can never, in the nature of things, either confirm or refute any human idea completely. This criterion too is sufficiently “indefinite” not to allow human knowledge to become “absolute”, but at the same time it is sufficiently definite to wage a ruthless fight on all varieties of idealism and agnosticism. If what our practice confirms is the sole, ultimate and objective truth, then from this must follow the recognition that the only path to this truth is the path of science, which holds the materialist point of view. 
V.I. Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: Critical Comments on a Reactionary Philosophy, 1908, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, 126-27

Thursday, 9 January 2014

'Iran's Nuclear Industry', ABC Radio National, Rear Vision, 07.10.07

Annabelle Quince: Welcome to Rear Vision with me, Annabelle Quince.

This week, the second part of our look at the history behind the current tension between Iran and the West, over Iran's nuclear industry.

George W. Bush: Iran remains the world's primary state sponsor of terror, pursuing nuclear weapons while depriving its people of the freedom they seek and deserve.

Fran Kelly: President Bush warned that letting Iran acquire nuclear weapons would put the Middle East 'under the shadow of a nuclear holocaust'.

David Laurence: The French Foreign Minister has put the international spotlight on Iran's nuclear program with his dire warning:

LANGUAGE

Translation: We have to prepare for the worst, said Bernard Kouchner, and the worst is war.

Elena Hall: Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has arrived in New York ready to tell the United Nations that his country's nuclear ambitions are purely peaceful.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad: We don't need the bomb. For 28 years we have defended ourselves in the face of enemy onslaughts. Every day they are becoming more powerful.

Annabelle Quince: Today, a program that first went to air last year, and which focuses on how and why Iran's nuclear industry has developed, and on the United States' determination to stop it.

Debate over Iran's nuclear industry has raged across the globe for almost a decade. And has come to a head in the past three years, with the United Nations threatening sanctions against Iran if it didn't open its facilities to international inspections, something that it has now agreed to do.

Iran has always claimed that it is not interested in nuclear weapons and is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Despite this, the Western world has remained sceptical of Iran's motives for pursuing nuclear technology.

The story of Iran's interest in nuclear technology goes back to the 1950s. Iran was then being led by the young Shah, who had been installed in power in 1953 after a CIA-led coup against the elected government of Mohamad Mossadeq. The then US President, Dwight Eisenhower, who had sanctioned the coup, introduced a program called Atoms for Peace. Mohammad Sahimi is Professor and Chairman of Chemical and Petroleum Engineering at the University of Southern California.

Mohammad Sahimi: In the late 1950s the administration of President Dwight Eisenhower, developed a program called Atoms for Peace and by which the United States intended to share its nuclear technology with developing countries like Iran, for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. At that time the government of the Shah of Iran and the US Administration signed a treaty by which the US would help Iran to set up a nuclear program.

Then in the 1960s the United States sold Iran a research nuclear reactor, a 5 megawatt reactor that was installed at Tehran Nuclear Research Centre at Harass Tehran University. That was in 1967 and that's how Iran's nuclear program actually started.

Annabelle Quince: It was two decades till the program took off, with the assistance of a number of people who are now senior figures in the Bush Administration.

Mohammad Sahimi: The drive for Iran's nuclear program did not actually start before 1973 when we had the Arab-Israeli war. After that war, the oil price went up dramatically and therefore Iran's income from its oil exports increased dramatically. At that time the Shah of Iran declared that oil was too expensive and too good to just burn it to generate energy and he wanted to look for other types of energy sources. And right after that, the United States started talking to the Shah to the US Ambassador in Tehran, Richard Helms, persuading him to go after nuclear energy. But the main driving force behind the program was actually the administration of Henry Kissinger, and also Donald Rumsfeld, the present Defence Secretary, Dick Cheney, the present Vice President was Chief of Staff at that time, and even Paul Wolfowitz who was the Deputy Secretary of Defence a couple of years ago, they all played their role in persuading the Shah of Iran to go after nuclear industry.

Annabelle Quince: What was to be gained on both sides? What was Iran hoping to get out of nuclear energy? What did they want to do with it? And what did America gain? Why were they trying to push a nuclear industry onto Iran?

Mohammad Sahimi: Well for Iran, it would allow it to export oil and not burn oil domestically to generate energy, and at the same time for the US, since the price of oil had gone up and the United States was spending a lot more money to import oil, it would have been very beneficial to the US economy to develop a huge market for its nuclear industry in Iran, because Iran and the United States signed an agreement by which Iran would buy eight nuclear reactors worth $15-billion, and remember we are talking about $15-billion 30 years ago, which means a lot more in present dollars.

Annabelle Quince: But did the Shah of Iran intend to develop a nuclear weapons program?

Mohammad Sahimi: Since the Shah of Iran was a close ally of the United States, the United States did not mind if the Shah even went after nuclear weapons, in fact the Shah did declare at some point that Iran was going to develop a nuclear weapon and there are documents that indicate that the Shah of Iran was secretly doing some research on how to use plutonium to make a nuclear bomb and the US actually was aware of it, but did not protest or mind at that time.

Annabelle Quince: Bennett Ramberg served in the State Department under the first President Bush, and argues that the US did not know about the Shah's nuclear weapons program.

Bennett Ramberg: Just before the Shah fell, he had created a small group to investigate the possibility of pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and this was done secretly, and he had acquired some technology that would facilitate that, laser enrichment technology for example. But his regime was overthrown and that ambition of course ended with that at that time.

Annabelle Quince: Was that something the United States knew about at all?

Bennett Ramberg: I'm not certain if the United States knew. Clearly there ought to have been questions about why he wanted certain technologies, for example this laser technology, which at the time was a rather sophisticated technology. But I haven't seen any reference to the fact that the United States is privy to the desires of the Shah to go forward with a nuclear weapons program.

Reporter: The unthinkable has finally happened. The Shah of Iran has left. Just 12 hours ago in freezing temperatures, the 59 year old Shah of Iran walked aboard his Boeing jet and with tears streaming down his face, finally left the country he'd dominated for 37 years.

Reporter: ... Ayatollah Khomeni the 78 year old opposition leader who's inspired a nation, uncoupled a 2,000 year old monarchy, has set foot again on his nation's soil for the first time for nearly 50 years.

Mohammad Sahimi: After the Iranian revolution, the first revolutionary government of Iran and the Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan decided that Iran really didn't need nuclear reactors and nuclear energy, given all the other problems that Iran had to deal with, and therefore they cancelled the agreement that they had signed with the United States regarding buying eight nuclear reactors, and they greatly limited Iran's nuclear research program. But the fact is after Iran-Iraq war started, and Iran found itself isolated, Iran decided to go back and look at the nuclear program that the Shah had started.

Annabelle Quince: So was it because they felt threatened by Iraq and the fact that Iraq was itself developing some kind of nuclear weapons, or was it they suddenly saw the need for nuclear power again?

Mohammad Sahimi: You have to remember that in 1981 the Israeli Air Force bombed Iraq nuclear reactor in Osirak and destroyed it. That in some sense, gave Iran the warning that Iraq is there after a nuclear bomb. At the same time as I mentioned during the Iran-Iraq war, especially the first year, Iran was totally isolated and no country was willing to sell Iran any weapons like these advanced weapons. And given that Iraq has invaded Iran and occupied a large chunk of Iranian territory in southern and south-western parts of the country, it is completely reasonable to think that security aspects played an important role in the thinking of the Iranian government when it decided to re-start Iran's nuclear program. I'm not saying that that was the only reason, but what I'm saying is that it is totally reasonable to think that that was at least one of the reasons that they considered when they decided to restart the program.

Annabelle Quince: Iran's attempts to revitalise its nuclear program were frustrated by United States sanctions. The distrust had begun with the overthrow of the Shah, and intensified with the Iran hostage crisis, when for 444 days, 66 US citizens were held hostage in Tehran.

Reporter: Well the event that the United States has always feared in Iran has now taken place. Four-hundred armed students have taken over the US Embassy and are holding diplomats hostage. The Ayatollah Khomeni has stated there'll be no talks without the Shah being returned to Iran.

Bennett Ramberg: The regime defined itself as a revolutionary regime with great antipathy towards the United States, and the United States was not willing to deal with such a regime, and the leverage it had other then the sanctions had put in preventing American companies from doing commerce with Iran were imposed, and Iran's support for terrorist activities in the region also soured relations further.

Annabelle Quince: So, if not to the US, where did the new Iranian government go to try and re-establish its nuclear program?

Mohammad Sahimi: What they did first was to go after Germany, West Germany at that time, in order to persuade them to come back to Iran, and finish the construction of two nuclear reactors in Bushehr the site of Iran's present nuclear reactor by the Persian Gulf. When Germany did not agree to do that, they tried to get other countries to come in and complete the project. They tried Czechoslovakia, they tried Argentina, they tried to get some parts of the reactor from Poland, from Italy, and in each cases, the United States actually prevented it, which I believe was a big mistake because if the Western countries at that time had gone back to Iran, had completed Iran's nuclear reactors in Bushehr and perhaps subsequent reactors, they would have had a big say in how those reactors would be run, and they would have had control on the nuclear fuel for those reactors and also nuclear fuel waste.

Annabelle Quince: The International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA, has stated that Iran probably gained assistance from some unknown source. One suggestion is that it came illegally from Pakistan.

Bennett Ramberg: It appears that Iran acquired enrichment technology from Pakistan. I think in the documentation provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency, they referred to the fact that it acquired enrichment technology from an undisclosed source. I don't believe it specified in the documentation, I may be incorrect though, that Pakistan was the provider, the agency has conferred with Pakistan. Whether this was done totally or solely through the Khan network or otherwise, is a little uncertain in my mind, but clearly Pakistan was involved in the acquiring of a centrifuge is designed to allow Iran to generate English uranium for the alleged peaceful program. The Russians stepped in, in the mid-'90s and they indicated that they would be willing to finance a reactor at Bushehr, and the reactor construction began and every year for the past several years, it's been declared that the reactor construction's near completion or it will be complete and again this year, it's been declared that the actual operations, or at least the fuel could be provided by this fall, that is the fall of 2006 and the operations could begin or commence shortly thereafter.

So this is the state of the program. The Iranian government has declared that they want to develop or acquire another 19 or so reactors in the decades to come. It takes roughly a decade to build a nuclear power plant. It can be done in a shorter time, and if you build multiple plants at one time, you get economy of scale presumably, in doing so, and the Iranians declared that they want to build up to 20 reactors or have 20 reactors in operation in years to come.

Annabelle Quince: Iran, unlike India, Pakistan or Israel, did ratify the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty in 1970 and is therefore required to keep the International Atomic Energy Agency, informed of all its nuclear facilities. But in 2002, an Iranian opposition group based in London revealed the existence of two previously unknown facilities. The revelation has thrown into question just how open the Iranian government has been.

Bennett Ramberg: Well it was a stunning revelation that apparently had never been disclosed before that the Iranians had these enriching facilities. They were supposed to be provided, that is the information pertaining to these facilities, the International Atomic Energy Agency, this is part of what's called a safeguards agreement, between the agency and Iran, and the agency learned about it as a result of the revelations provided by an Iranian dissident group in London that these facilities existed, and the agency queried the Iranians - and said can you establish whether this allegation is true or not, and given the detail provided by the dissident agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency demanded the right to inspect the sites, and the Iranians reluctantly allow this. And it was revealed that they an enrichment siting in preparation to generate iron-rich uranium, although the centrifuges themselves were not in place, nor were they generating any enriched uranium, or at least any substantial quantities.

Mohammad Sahimi: The fact that Iran did not declare the Natanz or the Arak facility to the International Atomic Energy Agency for so long, was not a violation of its legal obligation, towards the NPT agreement. The NPT agreement and safeguard has stipulated that if a country which is a member of NPT builds nuclear facilities, it is only obligated to report the existence of the facilities 180 days before any nuclear materials are introduced into the facility. So that means that member states are not under any obligation to report construction of nuclear facilities. Of course if they report it, that would create more trust with the agency, and the aspiring nation which is trying to set up an industrial nuclear facility, but if they don't it does not represent any violation of their obligation towards NPT agreement. At the same time I don't believe, as I pointed out in one of my articles, I don't believe if Iran had actually declared its intention back in 1985 that they want to set up extensive facilities for complete nuclear fuel cycle, the west would have rushed to help them. I believe that they would have done whatever they could to prevent Iran from actually developing and construction the facility. So I don't think that Iran could have circumvented the criticism that it is receiving now, if it had declared many, many years ago its intention and what it planned to do.

Annabelle Quince: The Iranians have long argued that despite their vast oil and gas reserves, they actually need a nuclear industry for power generation.

Mohammad Sahimi: I became interested several years ago in the course of whether Iran needs an alternative source of energy, given that it has vast reserves of oil and gas, and my conclusion was that because Iran exports oil and because oil exports make a big chunk of Iran's foreign currency earnings, about 80% of it, it makes perfect sense for Iran to look for alternative sources of energy and not burn oil in Iran in order to generate electricity. And at the same time, we all know that burning oil produces a lot of pollution. Iran has been suffering greatly; the air is polluted, the groundwater resources in Iran are largely polluted. So if you look at it from many different angles, it makes sense for Iran to go after an alternative source of energy other than oil and gas.

Annabelle Quince: Even if Iran does need nuclear power, does it need to enrich its own uranium?

Bennett Ramberg: Well there doesn't seem to be any economic justification for the enrichment program which provides fuel for reactors at this point in time. To justify that, the Iranians would need about 20 reactors. They don't have at this time one commercial reactor in operation. That reactor which may commence operating this year, may or may not, as a Russian supplied reactor located on the Persian Gulf called the Bushehr reactor, and there would be nothing to justify from an economic point of view of the fuel cycle programs which they've demanded allowance for. So this does raise serious apprehensions in my mind of what their objectives are. In the long term, for energy independence it would be desirable that they have these facilities, but again, at this point in time, for years to come there would be no justification for this.

Mohammad Sahimi: If Iran has its own domestic and nuclear industry, that can produce rich uranium. Even if it doesn't to use it for any illicit use or any illegal production of nuclear weapons, it does give it prestige, it does give it influence in the Middle East. So when Iran has developed all the know-how and technology in Iran, and has the facility of completing the facility for setting up uranium enrichment program and has the uranium mine in Iran that provides uranium ore, it is logical for Iran to try to have its own uranium enrichment program, and of course the main worry about the program is that the same program that can be used to generate nuclear fuel for nuclear reactors, can also be used for making nuclear weapons. So if there were trust between Iran and let's say Western Europe, maybe they could address that question in a more agreeable way, but in the absence of that trust, Iran doesn't trust the West because it doesn't trust the fact that if it develops a network of nuclear reactors, they will be actually willing to provide Iran with enriching uranium for the reactor.

Newsreader: The dispute over Iran's suspect nuclear program has dominated the first 24 hours of the Non Proliferation Treaty Conference.

Kofi Annan: In the name of God the compassionate the merciful. Mr President.
The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan's opening address urged Iran to give up the nuclear technology that could result in bomb-making, and Germany's Foreign Minister, Joshka Fischer warned Tehran if it insists on beginning the reprocessing of nuclear fuel, it could result in the complete breakdown of talks with the EU and a referral to the UN Security Council in the first step towards sanctions. But Iran's Foreign Minister, Karmal Karazi, dismissed the suspicions and censure saying Article 4 of the Non Proliferation Treaty guarantees non-nuclear arms states the right to peaceful nuclear technology, and said Iran is determined to carry out the uranium enrichment.

Karmal Karazi: Iran for its part, is determined to pursue all legal areas of nuclear technology, including enrichment, exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Annabelle Quince: Israel, Pakistan and India have all developed nuclear weapons and have not signed the NPT, yet all receive support from the United States. So is the US using a double standard when it's dealing with Iran?

Mohammad Sahimi: Oh there is no question. Not only there is sense, a very strong sense in Iran that there is a double standard, I mean the non-aligned countries can see it. I would like to emphasise this point that the most dangerous nuclear country in the world is Pakistan. This is a country which is run by its military, a military that has a lot of radical Islamist elements. This is the same military that - literarily created Taliban that took power in Afghanistan and provided refuge for Osama bin Laden, and at the same time for example, the United States has offered India advice and technology. Israel, as you pointed out is not even a member of NPT or is safeguard agreements and it is widely known and widely believed in the West that it has a very powerful and very extensive nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass destruction. The only thing that the American States has offered Iran has been threat and sanctions, so there is no question that we have very severe double standards here.

Bennett Ramberg: Well in the Iranian case they declared that the program is totally, absolutely for peaceful purposes, and they are party to the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty which went into force in 1970. And as a consequence and subject to the requirements of that agreement, the other three countries that you mentioned never signed the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. All three of those countries have actually developed nuclear weapons. So the Iranians are stuck on their own petard meaning that they agree that the program is totally for peaceful purposes, they have an obligation under the treaty to provide total transparency and they failed to do so for 18 years.

Annabelle Quince: According to Fred Halliday, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, the current crisis over Iran's nuclear industry has a lot to do with the battle between Iran and the US for control over West Asia.

Fred Halliday: The United States and Iran have been engaged in a major conflict across West Asia for over 25 years, since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. And now the focus is Iraq. Because what's happening in Iraq is there is one war between the US and its allies, and the Sunni Fundamentalist rebels. But that's on top of a deeper war between the US and Iran for control not just of Iraq but of Western Asia, and on the second matter the Iranians are winning. The US is handing Iraq to the Iranians by the strategy it's adopting. The US as it tries to draw down its own troops, or leave, has got two policies: 1) to train up Iraqi security forces in the Iraqi Army, and the second to organise elections which lead to the establishment of a civilian government in Iraq. But both those paths strengthen the hand of Iran, because most of the people who go into the security services and most of the militias operating with the US are Iranian controlled. And secondly, the elections are producing an electoral victory, quite properly, for pro-Iranian parties. In other words, everything the US does to get out of Iraq is strengthening the Iranian hand, so the real occupying power in Iraq is not the US, it's Iran. And that's beneath and much more important than the war between the guerillas and the US, and it links up with the fact Iranians now have an important influence in Lebanon through Hezbollah, who've actually entered the government now and now of course the Hamas victory has produced an Iranian ally on Israel's doorstep. The US and Israel are losing this big battle and that is the issue. This is if you like, a red hot poker that's poking the US over the nuclear question.

Annabelle Quince: Professor Fred Halliday, from the London School of Economics.

Thanks to Angus Kingston, who is the sound engineer for this program and to you for listening to Rear Vision here on ABC Radio National with me, Annabelle Quince.

'Oil, democracy and a CIA coup', ABC Radio National, Rear Vision, 30.09.07

Annabelle Quince: Hello, this is Rear Vision on ABC Radio National, this week with me, Annabelle Quince.

Today, the first of a two-part look at the history behind the conflict between America and Iran.

Elena Hall: Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has arrived in New York ready to tell the United Nations that his country's nuclear ambitions are purely peaceful.

Annabelle Quince: President Ahmadinejad was in New York last week trying to convince both the UN and the American people of Iran's peaceful intentions, but it's clear neither the US or its allies believe him.

Frank Kelly: President Bush warned that letting Iran acquire nuclear weapons would put the Middle East 'under the shadow of a nuclear holocaust'.

David Laurence: The French foreign minister has put the international spotlight on Iran's nuclear program, with this dire warning:

Translation: Again we have to prepare for the worst, said, Bernard Kouchner, and the worst is war.

Newsreader: Iran has accused France's foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, of staking a crisis after he warned that the world should prepare for war with Iran.

Tony Jones: You would have heard the French foreign minister saying, warning in fact, that the world should prepare for war. Do you agree with him?

John Bolton: Absolutely, life is about choices, and for choices between a nuclear capable Iran and the pre-emptive views of force to break their control over the nuclear fuel cycle, I don't think there's any question that's what you have to look at.

Annabelle Quince: John Bolton, the former US ambassador to the United Nations, and principal adviser to President Bush, talking to Tony Jones on Lateline.

Over the past few weeks, the war of words between Iran and the United States and its allies has escalated to the point where people are seriously discussing the possibility of a war or a military strike on Iran by the US.

Relations between Iran and the West have been strained for decades. On Rear Vision over the next two weeks we want to look at why this is so. Next week, the story of Iran's nuclear industry, which, you may be interested to learn, was begun by the US in the 1950s. And in today's program, the story of oil, a democracy movement and the CIA coup that destroyed it.

Iran, unlike its neighbours in the Middle East, was never colonised. But during the latter part of the 19th century, Iran and its rulers came under intense political and economic pressure from competing colonial powers, Britain and Russia. In 1901, the cash-strapped Shah of Iran sold the British a concession to explore for oil, effectively handing Britain control over Iran's oil reserves. Seven years later, commercial quantities of oil were discovered in south-western Iran. Stephen Kinzer is a veteran New York Times journalist, and the author of All the Shah's Men: An American coup and the roots of Middle East terror.

Stephen Kinzer: When the oil was actually found, it proved very easy for the British to pay a relatively paltry sum in exchange for what Winston Churchill described as 'a prize from Fairyland beyond our wildest dreams'. So all the oil that the British used to power their industrial growth during the 1920s and '30s and '40s, came from Iran. All the oil that the Royal Navy used to project British power all over the world, came from Iran. It was a vital resource that allowed the people of Britain to live at the standard of living they enjoyed all during that period. At the same time, the Iranians who were sitting on this ocean of oil were living in what were some of the lowest and most miserable standards of living in the world. So you had this terrible disconnect of British power being fuelled quite literally by oil from Iran, but Iranians not being able to profit at all because of this hugely unequal treaty that had been signed years earlier under the old Qajar Shah.

Annabelle Quince: So what was the deal, and how much of the profit from the oil reserves went back to Iran?

Stephen Kinzer: There was a vaguely worded deal in which the British agreed to pay 15% of the profits in perpetuity to Iran. However, no Iranians were ever allowed to look at the books, that was part of the deal. So you just had to take it on faith that this was a fair 15%, this amounted to a very small sum of money. In addition, the oil company was owned principally by the British government, and the British government, as a way of kind of cooking the books, established very heavy taxes on the oil company -- essentially was taxing itself, it was just funnelling revenue from Iran, through the oil company, into the British Treasury.

So it appears, as many Iranian analysts thought, although none were ever allowed to look at the books, that even the 15% they were sending was 15% after the government had already taxed something like 80% of the company's income, and just taken it into the Treasury. So no-one really knows how much the British paid, but it's clear that was a very tiny fraction of the actual value of the oil.

Annabelle Quince: In 1941 during World War II, the allies invaded Iran, deposed Reza Shah, who had ruled since 1921, and replaced him with his young son. Mark Gasiorowski is professor of political science and the editor of Mohammad Mossadeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran.

Mark Gasiorowski: He had been installed in power in 1941 at the age of 21 when the British and the Russians jointly invaded Iran to make a supply route for the Russian war effort. The Shah's father, Reza Shah, was not regarded as being pliable enough and the British and the Russians were concerned that Reza Shah might be pro-German, and just couldn't stand that, so they overthrew Reza Shah and installed on the throne his young son. So the young Shah was only 21 years old at the time, he had a very weak personality, he was a very brooding figure, and not at all decisive, and that remained the case up until the Mossadeq era, he was not a dominant, powerful monarch. He was something more than a constitutional monarch -- let's say the sort that Britain has now -- but he was not the kind of strong dominant monarch that he later became. And so in this period from 1941 until Mossadeq became Prime Minister, in 1951, this is a period of, I wouldn't really call it democracy, but I would certainly call it pluralism, when there was very wide open political activity in Iran. Very quickly, during World War II, lots of different political parties emerged, lots of different newspapers emerged, the parliament quickly became a very dynamic body. It was a real period of political ferment.

Annabelle Quince: Professor Mansour Farhang served as the Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations after Iran's revolution in 1979 and was a young man in Tehran during this period.

Mansour Farhang: This was the period that every political formation in Iran, from the royalists to the communists -- even the fascist party -- they were all active. Organising, publishing, debating, demonstrating, so it was chaotic but nevertheless it was an experience of democratic politics that Iranians had never had. And Mossadeq emerged as the most popular and the most trusted leader of the nationalist liberal forces in Iran. He was a Swiss-educated lawyer and yet he was deeply connected with Iranian culture and in folk ways.

Annabelle Quince: Mossadeq's policies put him at odds with the British and the ruling elite in Iran.

Mansour Farhang: He had two principles. One was nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry and settlement of the differences with the British through peaceful or legal means, and his second objection was to create infrastructure for open and free elections in Iran. So the first principle threatened British interests in the region; this was the very first time that a native government in the Middle East region was challenging British interests, the very first time. And then his second goal, establishment and implementation of free elections, that was extremely threatening to the land-owning class, particularly in the countryside, and these old aristocratic type people who were connected to the monarchical regime and they simply did not want to submit to free elections, but they knew that free elections in Iran would have meant significant reduction of their power and influence. So there was this coalition between old-time political class in Iran and Great Britain, and this combination finally managed to solicit the support of the United States.

Annabelle Quince: In 1951 Mohammad Mossadeq was elected prime minister of Iran by the parliament, and the first thing he did was nationalise the oil industry.

Mark Gasiorowski: Well the reaction from the British was just a certain amount of astonishment and certainly disdain towards this Iranian upstart who would do such a thing, and they very quickly came to the decision that they were going to take all sorts of means to try to stop Mossadeq and reverse the oil nationalisation. So very quickly, within the following weeks they began to gear up a full-scale embargo of Iranian oil exports which was very successful. They slapped various kinds of economic sanctions on Iran, they began covert operations with their various intelligence assets inside Iran, to try to overturn Mossadeq. They even geared up an invasion plan; they were all set to invade Iran in September 1951, and it was only intervention by President Truman that stopped the British from invading South Western Iran and seizing the oil areas.

Stephen Kinzer: Mossadeq was a huge figure because no-one from a poor country had ever challenged the rulers of the world the way that Mossadeq did. In the subsequent years you had Nasser and a whole series of other leaders who challenged the ruling system in the world, but no-one had done it before Mossadeq. He stood up against all the powers of the world on behalf of a cause that most people in most countries thought was very just, namely the Iranian control over Iranian oil. This conflict reached such a peak that Mossadeq actually came to the United Nations.

The British were trying to pass a resolution there demanding that he give back the oil company which he had seized and the Security Council refused, after Mossadeq spoke, to agree with that resolution. That was the first time ever that an important political resolution at the UN Security Council presented by a big power had ever failed to win approval. So it was really a titanic challenge to colonial power when Mossadeq became prime minister and immediately with unanimous of both houses of the Iranian parliament, announced the nationalisation of the Anglo Iranian Oil Company. That led to a huge crisis, the oil was shut down, the British withdrew all their technicians and blockaded Iranian ports so that no Iranian oil could be exported. The British tried to stop him at the United Nations, they tried to file a case against Iran at the World Court in The Hague where Mossadeq also turned up and the World Court ruled in favour of Iran. So nothing succeeded and this is what led to the crisis when the British realised If we don't do something radical, we are going to lose the most valuable foreign asset we possess in the whole world. And that's what led to the coup of 1953.

Mark Gasiorowski: The attitude of the Truman administration was that first of all they were very concerned about unrest in the Middle East, you know this was a time when the State of Israel had been created, there was now the Palestinian refugee problem, there was nationalist unrest spreading throughout the Arab world, there was real fear that the Middle East would catch fire, and the Truman administration and especially Secretary of State Atcheson, were very sensitive to this, and very much had the idea that the United States should not throw gasoline on the fire and should not antagonise this unrest that was sweeping the region, and so the attitude of the Truman administration really until it finally left office in January, 1953, was to try to act more or less in an even-handed manner as an honest broker between the British and Iranians.

Now when the Eisenhower administration came into office, it was very different. You know, it was a change in leadership, pretty similar for example, to 2001 when the Clinton administration was replaced by the George W. Bush administration, really any of the other times in modern American history when Democrats have been replaced by Republicans, you usually see the same pattern, you know, relatively open-minded, moderate, progressive, people being replaced by much more hard-nosed Republicans. And this was very much the case in 1953. The key foreign policy leaders in the Eisenhower administration who were John Foster Dulles, the incoming secretary of state, and his brother, the incoming CIA director, Alan Dulles, they had been talking already before the inauguration about doing something with Mossadeq, trying to get rid of him. They were also very interested and intrigued with the idea of using covert intelligence operations to do things, and so they came into office very anxious to try to do something about Mossadeq, and indeed about two weeks after Eisenhower was inaugurated, in other words, very early on, the initial decision was made by John Foster Dulles to start preparations for a coup.

Now that being said, Eisenhower himself didn't go along with that for about two more months. It was not until mid-March, 1953 that Eisenhower finally agreed that the US should go forward with planning a coup.

BBC Reporter: There's no doubting the significance of a code word being broadcast. It was a prearranged signal to the Shah of Iran that plans were in place for a coup against Dr Mohamad Mossadeq, the leader of the country's elected government. This 200-page CIA report, less than subtly entitled 'Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran' details the unfolding plot led by an American agent called Kermit Roosevelt.

Stephen Kinzer: Kermit Roosevelt was a fascinating character. He really was a true-life James Bond, and when it was decided that the United States would overthrow Mossadeq, he was the guy that the CIA turned to. They gave him the job, they told him 'You've got to go to Iran and you've got to do everything you need to do and you've got to overthrow Mossadeq'. Kermit Roosevelt crossed over clandestinely into Iran at the beginning of August 1953. He went to work in a basement office in the US Embassy and immediately began building a network of people basically by bribing them. He bribed all manner of people; one of the early plots that he came up with was that he would try to bribe enough members of parliament so that maybe they could vote in a No Confidence motion to depose Mossadeq. And a number of them accepted these bribes, and they broke away from the Mossadeq coalition.

But the idea of deposing Mossadeq through a vote of No Confidence never panned out. So Kermit Roosevelt went off and did other things with his money. For example, he bribed mullahs, the religious leaders in Iran, to begin denouncing Mossadeq from the pulpit as an atheist, or non-believer, which was not true as Mossadeq was a devout Twelver Shi'ite. He bribed newspaper editors and reporters, to the point where he had 80% of the Iranian press in his payroll. And what that meant was that every day, Iranians would wake up to news reports and commentaries about how Mossadeq was Jewish, he was homosexual, he was a British agent, just about anything bad you could think of, would show up day after day in practically every newspaper in Tehran. So by the spreading around of money, Kermit Roosevelt was immediately going to change the public tenor and view of Mossadeq.

He also bribed commanders of military and police units so they would be ready to help on the day that he struck against Mossadeq. One of the things that he did -- perhaps this was his most masterful idea -- he went to the Tehran bazaar, where there was a group of thugs operating under a very colourful leader named Shabaan the Brainless. And he hired Shabaan, who actually is still alive and living in California, and Shabaan's job was: Get together the biggest group of thugs and gangsters you can find; we're going to pay every one of them. Find every adult male who wants to be a gangster for a day and hire them. And what your job is, (and this is exactly what this gang did for several days in Tehran) run through the streets wildly, smash shop windows, fire guns into mosques and then shout 'We love Communism and Mossadeq'.

So he created this mob that was very violent, that was posing as thugs for Mossadeq. But that wasn't all. Roosevelt went one step further: he hired another mob to attack that mob, the idea being he wanted to create the image, in the minds of ordinary Iranians, that Iran was in chaos.

Mark Gasiorowski: They organised a crowd. It marched from southern Tehran up into the central area of the city. Gradually other Iranians joined these crowds, and at the same time certain military units that were supporting the coup took certain steps. They went and attacked Mossadeq's home and had a long military battle with loyalist forces there; they seized a radio station, seized certain key intersections and places like that. And eventually during the course of the day, both with the crowds in the streets and the military units, the coup forces managed to prevail. Mossadeq was forced to flee out of his house, he hid for a day or two and eventually gave himself up, and the pro-Mossadeq forces were just overwhelmed. And by the end of the day, on the 19th, the coup forces had succeeded.

Stephen Kinzer: This coup is a classic in the history of American interventions abroad in one sense, and that is it seemed successful at first. But in the long run, when we look back on it, we can see that it had terrible, unintended consequences. The reason it seemed successful was we got rid of a guy we didn't like, and we put in someone who would do whatever we said, that was the Shah.

But then what happened? The Shah ruled with increasing repression for 25 years, his repression produced the explosion of the late 1970s in Iran, what we called the Islamic Revolution. That revolution brought to power a clique of fanatically anti-Western clerics who have spent the last 25 years intensely and sometimes very violently working to undermine western interests all over the world. That 1979 Islamic Revolution also inspired Muslim fundamentalists in many countries, including next-door Afghanistan, where a radical regime then came to power and gave sanctuary to Osama bin Laden, with the results we all know. So this is an example of many American operations which seemed to go well at first, but only now, decades later when we look back and see how badly they actually turned out.

Annabelle Quince: Stephen Kinzer sees a direct connection between the coup of 1953, the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and the current confrontation between Iran and the United States.

Stephen Kinzer: I found a fascinating article in some academic journal written by an Iranian professor who turns out to have been one of the hostage-takers. He was one of the students that stormed the American Embassy in 1979, and held the diplomats hostage. In this article he writes about why we did it. I myself had never really understood why they did it. He said, 'It all went back to 1953. That was all we were thinking about.

What happened in 1953? The people of Iran rose up and they threw the Shah out. But CIA agents working inside the US Embassy organised another coup, and they brought him back, with terrible results for us and our country. Now it's 1979, 25 years later, the whole thing is happening again. The Shah has now been thrown out again, 25 years later, a second time. But we figure that history will repeat itself, that CIA agents working inside the US Embassy will do what they did last time, which is organise some kind of other coup and bring the Shah back. We felt', he wrote, 'we had to prevent history from repeating itself, that's why we went into the American Embassy'.

So now we're in a position where the United States government and political establishment really feels a passionate anger and resentment of the Iranian regime that dates back to the humiliations of 1979. They took away our Shah, they held our diplomats hostage for more than a year, and they've never paid a price for that. It's the same regime that's in power. So there's a psychological feeling in the minds of many people in Washington that we need to get back at them for this, we cannot negotiate with them, we have to confront them, we have unfinished business with Iran, and that goes back to 1979. Why did that whole 1979 set of circumstances happen? The Islamic Revolution and the taking of the American hostages. The explanation goes back to the American intervention in 1953. That set us off on the path to the confrontation between Iran and the United States that we're seeing right now.

Annabelle Quince: That's Rear Vision this week. Thanks to sound engineer Timothy Nicastri.

And if you're looking for some background to the current demonstrations that have been going on in Burma, you might check out Keri Phillips's program on modern Burma in our features section on the website.

I'm Annabelle Quince, and you've been listening to Rear Vision on ABC Radio National. Thanks for your company.

US Human Experimentation: 2

Thom Shanker, ‘US chemical war on its own forces’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 10.10.02

The United States exposed its forces to chemical warfare and live biological agents during Cold War military exercises in America, Canada and Britain, secret documents cleared for release to Congress reveal

Sixteen newly declassified reports describe how chemical and biological exercises used deadly substances such as VX and sarin to test the vulnerability of forces.

William Winkenwerder, a Pentagon official, said military personnel in the tests were given protection from the toxins available at the time, though he conceded that those were primitive compared with what is available today.

The Pentagon is working with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs to identify an estimated 5500 people believed to have participated in the tests, because it remains unclear whether all of them were fully aware of the subject of the exercises, and the risks they presented.

Congress has scheduled hearings this week to examine the documents, and the Government’s responsibility to any veterans who are suffering ill effects.

One Republican member of the House of Representatives, Christopher Smith, said: “At a time when our nation may be called upon to fight a war to protect Americans from chemical and biological terrorism, it is tragic to learn that four decades earlier some of Americas’s soldiers and sailors were unwitting participants in tests using live chemical and biological toxins.”

The tests were not to study medical effects on humans of chemical and biological weapons. The tests on land were to learn more about how chemical and biological weapons would be affected by climate, environment and other combat conditions. Tests at sea were to test to vulnerability of warships, and to gauge how sailors might respond to the attack while continuing to fight.

Tests conducted with the Canadian Government used VX, and tests with Britain used sarin and VX, the documents show. Both disrupt the body’s nervous system, and are lethal.

The legacy of the tests puts the Pentagon in a difficult position, trying to balance the legitimate health concerns of veterans - and anger at the lack of information on possible exposure - against the record of Democratic and Republican administrations struggling to defend the nation against the threat of chemical or biological attack.

The process of identifying veterans began in September 2000 under pressure from a Democrat who is one of the leaders in the fight to identify veterans who have been exposed to risk. Senator Mike Thompson said: “The Department of Defence has not only subjected our own soldiers to dangerous substances, it may have put civilians it is charged with protecting at risk.

“It is appalling that 40 years have passed and this information is just now being disclosed.”