Monday, 23 September 2013


The Philosophy of Plotinus: Part Two


Movement and rest in ‘thought’, the most intense activity and stillness in unity


The hypostases are interconnected, with Body having its existence in Soul, Soul its source in Intellect1 and Intellect its generation from the One. At the same time the One has independence from Intellect as Intellect in turn has from Soul. The notion of illumination passes through the Enneads. The One lights Intellect which in turn illuminates Soul which gives light to this universe. The further away from the One, the weaker the illumination.

The double movement in Plotinus’ doctrine - from unity to increasing multiplicity and return to unification and unity concerns an eternal outpouring from a transcendent One, descending through levels to the lowest reality - the universe of matter and the senses. With the purpose of showing the way to God, it is also an urging of soul through purification2 and simplification to ascend from a meditation on this universe to the one of intelligible reality, to union with the Good, which alone can give Soul true satisfaction. The impetus for the ascent is the memory of a beauty infinitely greater than its weak presence in this world. 

Plotinus believed we have forgotten our true nature, which lies within us. So this ‘ascent of the mind to God’, fuelled by desire and remembrance, is equally a journey within, to the core of our being. The One is like the centre of concentric circles. It is beyond thought and desire, and therefore beyond movement. Intellect, which is thought and desire, both moves around the One, and is at contemplative rest. Soul, moved by aspiration towards and desire for Intellect, revolves around it.3  

Progress of the soul in freeing itself from illusion and moving towards its goal, beyond the Platonic world of Forms, requires enormous moral and spiritual striving, of which few are capable4 and signifies a deepening contemplation, a closer communion between soul and its origin in pure reality.5 Plotinus’ philosophy unites the religious and the philosophical. Armstrong wrote that it amounts to a prayer.6  

The perfect One, without movement, eternally creates and actuates its image, Intellect. Number gives Intellect - the eternal living reality and perfect unity-in-multiplicity - its structure. It in turn produces its image and activity, Soul. Nature is the lower phase and image of Soul, which, as its rational forming principle, carries form to matter.7 Though aspiring to Intellect in a ceaseless contemplation and therefore productive, it is almost the lowest form of contemplation, producing weak and dreamy forms, below which is only matter.

What does this mean? That what is called nature is a soul, the offspring of a prior soul with a stronger life; that it quietly holds contemplation in itself, not directed upwards or even downwards, but at rest in what it is, in its own repose and a kind of self-perception, and in this consciousness and self-perception it sees what comes after it, as far as it can, and seeks no longer, but has accomplished a vision of splendour and delight.8

Matter (which also exists in Intellect), receives the Forms in the three-dimensional space of this universe. Though often referred to in the Enneads as ‘evil’, it has a weak tendency towards the One and so shares in its superabundant productivity.

Activity in the divine is reflected in the activity of the material universe. Existence at every level tends through quickening aspiration to rejoin the level above, of which it is a product and image. Contemplation of the source of an hypostasis always precedes and generates activity and production. 

The procession of Intellect from the One is necessary and eternal, as are also the procession of Soul from Intellect and the forming and ordering of the material universe by Soul. This emanation from the One is because everything perfect is creative and produces something else. Here we touch an element in Plotinus’s thought which is of great importance, the emphasis on life, on the dynamic, vital character of spiritual being. Perfection for him is not merely static. It is a fullness of living and productive power. The One for him is Life and Power, an infinite spring of power, an unbounded life, and therefore necessarily productive.9


Plotinus’ philosophy concerns one vast living system, streaming from the One.10   

...as the (Divine) plan holds, life is poured copiously throughout a Universe, engendering the universal things and weaving variety into their being, never at rest from producing an endless sequence of comeliness and shapeliness, a living pastime.11 


Life is an activity and power which is omnipresent, ever fresh, inexhaustible, ‘brimming over with its own vitality’,12 unquantifiable and indivisible - what is in the whole is in the part. The greater the living movement, the greater the beauty, and the more the embodied Good, which wakes and raises up the souls of those who respond to it. Hence the more intense is Soul’s desire for the source of that life, for the unity which overcomes loneliness and spiritual incompleteness.13 

So here below also beauty is what illuminates good proportions rather than the good proportions themselves, and this is what is loveable. For why is there more light of beauty on a living face, but only a trace of it on a dead one, even if its flesh and its proportions are not yet wasted away? And are not the more life-like statues the more beautiful ones, even if the others are better proportioned? And is not an uglier living man more beautiful than the beautiful man in a statue? Yes, because the living is more desirable; and this is because it has soul; and this is because it has more the form of good; and this means that it is somehow coloured by the light of the Good, and being so coloured wakes and rises up and lifts up that which belongs to it, and as far as it can makes it good and wakes it.14 


Life for Plotinus is eternal creativity and creation, ultimately that of self.15 He several times used the metaphor of a tree to illustrate the process:

For the gathering together of all things into one is the principle, in which all are together and all make a whole. And individual things proceed from this principle while it remains within; they come from it as from a single root which remains static in itself, but they flower out into a divided multiplicity, each one bearing an image of that higher reality, but when they reach this lower world one comes to be in one place and one in another, and some are close to the root and others advance farther and split up to the point of becoming, so to speak, branches and twigs and fruits and leaves; and those that are closer to the root remain for ever...16 

Part Two/To be continued... 

Notes.
1. Both Intellect and Soul are Forms.

2. Plotinus distinguished between ‘civic’ and ‘purificatory’ virtues. The former pertain to life in this world, the latter to those which lead the Soul to ‘another life, that of the Gods’ and in Intellect. I,2.7.

3. ‘All things are around the King of all, and That is the cause of all good and beautiful things, and all things belong to That, and the second things are around the Second and the third around the Third.’  I,7.2. This is one of the foundation-texts of Neoplatonic theology and is quoted from the questionably authentic Second Letter of Plato (312e1-4). In the Timaeus circles are the governing force in the universe and in our heads. Also ‘...if one ranks the Good as a centre one would rank Intellect as an unmoved circle and Soul as a moving circle; but moving by aspiration.’ IV,4.16.

4. ‘...to those of power to reach, it is present; to the inapt, absent.’ VI,9.7. Cf. Bergson’s identification of two moral and spiritual types and his comparison between ‘static religion’ and ‘dynamic religion’ in ‘The Two Sources of Morality and Religion’, 1932.

5. Soul arrives at Intellect by contemplation but Intellect arrives at the Good through immediate unity with it.

6. Ibid, Vol.5, 29. ‘What is new (in Plotinus’ system)...is the notion of making the ‘Ideas’ states of being of the Intellect and no longer distinct objects, of bringing the very subject of thought into the intelligible world, of considering the hypostases less as entities than as spiritual attitudes.’ Henry op. cit., li.

7. Here I use Armstrong’s terminology. MacKenna translated this as ‘Lower Soul’, ‘Nature-Looking and Generative Soul’, ‘Logos of the Universe’ and ‘ Reason-Principle of the Universe’.

8. III,8.4. Also ‘the Nature best and most to be loved may be found there only where there is no least touch of Form.’ VI,7.33.

9. Armstrong, op. cit., vol. I, xviii-xix.

10. ‘...Life streaming from Life; for energy runs through the Universe and there is no extremity at which it dwindles out...’ III,8.5. ‘...the law is, “some life after the Primal Life, a second where there is a first; all linked in one unbroken chain; all eternal; divergent types being engendered only in the sense of being secondary”.’ II,9.3.

11. III,2.15.

12. VI,5.12. The vital power of Romanticism, traceable to Plotinus’ doctrine, does not imitate nature, it is the hand of nature. Thus the artwork is not at third remove from the Idea, rather, it carries the viewer ‘upwards’ and ‘inwards’ to it. See Kant’s Critique of Judgement (1790) Bk II, Analytic of the Sublime, No. 46 (Fine art is the art of genius) ‘Since talent, as an innate productive faculty of the artist, belongs itself to nature, we may put it this way: Genius is the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art.’  The Sturm und Drang movement in Germany between 1770 and 1790 (with parallels in England and France) was the earliest expression of Romanticism and had vitalism as its nucleus.

13. ‘Here is living, the true; that of today, all living apart from Him, is but a shadow, a mimicry.’ VI,9.9. Although the Cubists’ use of (developments on) the philosophies of Plato and Plotinus was certainly influenced by the ‘alienating’ effects of rapid technological developments at the turn of the century, Panofsky positioned this in a deeper, historical context, arguing that doubt and the turn to speculative thought (questioning the relationship between reality, senses, ‘mind’ and artistic production) dates from Mannerism. ‘...the Mannerists considered it obvious that this “idea” or concetto could by no means be purely subjective or “psychological”; and the question arose, for the first time, how it was at all possible for the mind to form a notion of this kind - a notion that cannot simply be obtained from nature, yet must not originate in man alone. This question led eventually to the question of the possibility of artistic production as such...precisely such a way of thinking was bound to realise that that which in the past had seemed unquestionable was thoroughly problematical: the relationship of the mind to reality as perceived by the senses...Before the eyes of art theorists there opened an abyss hidden until then, and they felt the need to close it by means of philosophical speculation...Earlier art theory (pre- mid-sixteenth century) had tried to lay the practical foundations for artistic production; now it had to face the task of proving its theoretical legitimacy. Thought now took refuge, so to speak, in a metaphysics meant to justify the artist in claiming for his inner notions a suprasubjective validity as to both correctness and beauty.’  Panofsky, op. cit., 82-83. Also ‘At odds with nature the human mind fled to God in that mood at once triumphant and insecure...’, ibid., 99. More broadly (or perhaps more profoundly) - ‘the opposition between “idealism” and “naturalism” that ruled the philosophy of art until the end of the nineteenth century and under multifarious disguises - Expressionism and Impressionism, Abstraction and Empathy - retained its place in the twentieth, must in the final analysis appear as a “dialectical antinomy.”...To recognise the diversity of these solutions and to understand their historical presuppositions is worthwhile for history’s sake, even though philosophy has come to realise that the problem underlying them is by its very nature insoluble.’ Ibid., 126.

14. VI,7.22. ‘Why are the most living portraits the most beautiful, even though the other happen to be more symmetric? Why is the living ugly more attractive than the sculptured handsome? It is that the one is more nearly what we are looking for, and this because there is soul there, because there is more of the Idea of The Good...and this illumination awakens and lifts the soul and all that goes with it, so that the whole man is won over to goodness and in the fullest measure stirred to life.’ VI,7.22. Plato also tied life to truth. On the superiority of speech to writing - Socrates: ‘I mean the kind that is written on the soul of the hearer together with understanding...’ Phaedrus replied: ‘You mean the living and animate speech of a man with knowledge, of which written speech might fairly be called a kind of shadow.’  Phaedrus 276.

15. ‘If there had been a moment from which He began to be, it would be possible to assert his self-making in the literal sense; but since what He is He is from before eternity, his self-making is to be understood as simultaneous with Himself; the being is one and the same with the making, the eternal ‘bringing into existence’.’ VI.8,20. Also ‘Is that enough? Can we end the discussion by saying this? No, my soul is still in even stronger labour. Perhaps she is now at the point when she must bring forth, having reached the fullness of her birth-pangs in her eager longing for the One.’ V.3,17.

16. III,3.7. Also ‘The Supreme is the Term of all; it is like the principle and ground of some vast tree of rational life; itself unchanging, it gives reasoned being to the growth into which it enters.’ VI,8.15, and IV,4.11. In Creative Evolution, Bergson wrote ‘...life is tendency, and the essence of a tendency is to develop in the form of a sheaf, creating, by its very growth, divergent directions among which its impetus is divided.’ In H. Larrabee, ed. Selections from Bergson. New York, 1949, 72. Also compare Plotinus - ‘The fact that the product contains diversity and difference does not warrant the notion that the producer must be subject to corresponding variations. On the contrary, the more varied the product, the more certain the unchanging identity of the producer: even in the single animal the events produced by Nature are many and not simultaneous; there are the age periods, the developments at fixed epochs - horns, beard, maturing breasts, the acme of life, procreation - but the principles which initially determined the nature of the being are not thereby annulled...this is the unalterable wisdom of the Cosmos...’ IV.4,11 with Bergson ‘The animal takes its stand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and time, is one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death.’ From Creative Evolution in Selections from Bergson. op. cit.,105.

Sunday, 22 September 2013

28.10.1997

The Philosophy of Plotinus

Movement and rest in ‘thought’, the most intense activity and stillness in unity

Plotinus, the main expositor of Neoplatonism, was critical of democracy, had friends in the Roman aristocracy, and, despite the rejection of his proposal for the construction of Platonopolis, to be a city of philosophers functioning according to Plato’s Laws, was highly regarded by the emperor Gallienus. His writings, in the Enneads (according to Porphyry, from the age of forty nine), represent his mature thought.

Within this body of pacific austerity, Plotinus’ mysticism builds to a rationalised ecstasy. Reflecting this tension, his equation between contemplation and activity is central to his doctrine. By turning away from the external world1 and an inward concentration of spiritual energy through ‘reason’, the aim of his philosophy was that his soul and the souls of others might re-discover their true self and ascend to union with it and with their common source in god.  

Although he was the last great philosopher of Western antiquity, developments on his treatment of spiritual freedom and purpose have continued to the present.2  His work is a blend of the writings of Plato, Aristotle and other Greek philosophers (particularly the Stoics).3 Major sources from his own time were Numenius of Apamea and Ammonius Saccas, of whom he was a pupil. His dominant influence, however, was clearly Plato.

Plotinus was open in his regard for Plato - ‘that godlike man Plato’,4 ‘the illustrious Plato’.5 His debt to Plato, as revealed in the Enneads, was always in his thoughts. He regarded his own writing as following and interpreting Plato’s philosophy, even attributing his mysticism to him. 

The Plotinian scholar Paul Henry believes that the continued life of Plato’s philosophy is borne within that of Plotinus, in which dialectic becomes metaphysics - and that as a mystic, Plotinus has been perhaps a greater inspiration for Western philosophy than even Plato himself.6 

Such distinctions between Platonic dialectic and Neoplatonic metaphysics are misleading since the differences which exist lie essentially in points of form not in the process of the philosophers’ intent.7 Plotinus developed on a philosophy which itself underwent significant development by Plato. The shift by the latter in his treatment of non-discursive elements (particularly the emotions) in relation to ‘reason’ - first banishing them, then in his later dialogues, allowing them a role in the soul’s aspiration to truth8 - is carried further by Plotinus, in whose philosophy they were central to the attainment of the Good.

Both Plato and Plotinus distinguished between the realm of Ideas beyond time, and the sensible world of matter, existing in time. They also held to a transcendent God, beyond even Ideas and, following from Socrates, both considered the soul to be immaterial and immortal. 

One variation between the philosophies of the two men concerns the location of the Forms. For Plato, they exist in the ‘place above the heavens’9 but for Plotinus they are more forcefully tied to the nature of soul. Yet, both in the general inward tenor of his philosophy, and overtly, Plato prepared the ground for Plotinus believing that the Forms can exist within the individual.10  

Movement and the tension between it and the Good is central to Plotinus’ philosophy and is considered to be another difference between the doctrines of the two men,11 but again, Plotinus developed on what lay in the work of his predecessor. ‘Thought’s’ double movement of ascent to and descent from the most general concepts of the higher world, around which the Enneads were written, was established in the Republic.12 The importance Plotinus accords to the emotions, in both his style - eager and inspired with spiritual purpose - and in his method, is reflected in the significance movement has in his philosophy. His positioning of vitality and intuition as non-discursive means embodies this.  

In order of rank and emanation, the three hypostases around which the Enneads are built are the One (the Good - for which Plotinus frequently used masculine pronouns), Intellect (Divine Mind or Thought - the realm of Forms) and Soul (All-Soul, the Principle of Life). Nature is a quasi-hypostasis. The Gods are frequently mentioned. Beneath the universe of Intellect is the universe of matter. Each hypostasis is inferior to the one preceding it and good to that which follows it, matter having the lowest standing.13
--

Part One/To be continued... 

Notes.
1. Porphyry wrote that Plotinus ‘laboured strenuously to free himself and rise above the bitter waves of this blood-drenched life’. Porphyry, ‘On the Life of Plotinus and the Arrangement of His Work’ in The Enneads. Third ed. Abridged. Trans. S. MacKenna. London: Penguin, 1991, cxxi.

2. Ficino’s translation into Latin of Plotinus’ philosophy in 1492 was pivotal to this. (He produced the first Latin translation of all Plato’s dialogues in 1484.)

3. ‘In style Plotinus is concise, dense with thought, terse, more lavish of ideas than of words, most often expressing himself with a fervid inspiration. He followed his own path rather than that of tradition, but in his writings both the Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines are sunk; Aristotle’s Metaphysics, especially, is condensed in them, all but entire.’ Porphyry, op. cit., cxii. (Porphyry wrote a [lost] commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, known to Arab scholars.) MacKenna, consistent with his lyricism, wrote that the Enneads embody the pouring of new wine into very old bottles. See MacKenna’s notes in Plotinus. The Enneads.  Third ed. Trans. S. MacKenna.  London: Faber and Faber, 1962.

4. Enneads  III,5.1. Further citations from the Enneads will omit the title.

5. IV,8.1.

6. P. Henry. ‘The Place of Plotinus in the History of Thought’. In The Enneads. Third ed. Abridged, op. cit., xlii - lxxxiii.

7. Compare the best-known ‘distinctions’ between the two philosophies - alternately, Plotinus’ division of reality into levels and his postulation of a One superior to the realm of Forms - with the sub-sections in Plato’s analogy of the Divided Line (Intelligence, Mathematical Reasoning, Belief and Illusion) Republic VI, 509d-511e, reflected in the hierarchy of both Plato’s ideal state and model of the soul, and ‘“The good therefore may be said to be the source not only of the intelligibility of the objects of knowledge, but also of their being and reality; yet it is not itself that reality, but is beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and power.”’ Republic VI, 509b. Further, ‘...on at least one occasion (Plato) lectured to a general audience. We are told by Aristoxenus, a pupil of Aristotle, that many in Plato’s audience were baffled and disappointed by a lecture in which he maintained that Good is one.’ The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Ed. R. Audi. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, 623.) Panofsky, for example, accepted Plato at his word, confusing the reason of cognition with the non-discursive ‘reason’ of dualist contemplation, contributing to the maintenance of both a false distinction between Plato and Plotinus and a barrier to an understanding of their philosophies, of the relationship between them, and of their impact on Western culture. ‘Ultimately the theory of Ideas, originally a philosophy of human reason, was transformed almost into a logic of divine thought.’ E. Panofsky. Idea: A Concept in Art Theory. 1924. Reprint. Trans. J. Peake. New York: Harper and Row,1968, 38. Nietzsche made the same error, regarding Platonic dialectic as a development on Socratic rationalism (The Birth of Tragedy (1872) Section 13, in The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner. Trans. W. Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1967, 88-89). Similarly Deleuze, who, despite noting Bergson’s ‘obsession with the pure’ and that his method of intuition was Platonic in inspiration, distinguished between Bergson and Plato on the point of the latter’s dialectic (writing that Bergson considered Platonic dialectic to be valid only in the beginning of philosophy). G. Deleuze. Bergsonism. Trans. H. Tomlinson, B. Habberjam. New York, 1988, 22, 120. Again, Stern-Gillet: ‘He (Plotinus) locates selfhood in the soul, further specifying that the inner core of our being is that ‘part’ of the soul which is capable not only of discursive thinking directed at the forms immanent in this world, but also of the intuitive understanding of intelligible realities as such.’ S. Stern-Gillet. “Plotinus and His Portrait.” The British Journal of Aesthetics 37, 3 (July 1997): 211-225, 214. In the Timaeus, Plato distinguished between the ‘rational’ and the scientific. He equated dialectic with ‘pure thought’, ‘intelligence’, and the direct apprehension of truth. Republic VI, 511b. Plotinus regarded Platonic dialectic as ‘authentic science’ which he opposed to ‘seeming-knowledge (‘sense-knowledge’)’ I,3.4, and defined it as ‘the Method, or Discipline, that brings with it the power of pronouncing with final truth upon the nature and relation of things - what each is, how it differs from others, what common quality all have, to what Kind each belongs and in what rank each stands in its Kind and whether its Being is Real-Being, and how many beings there are, and how many non-Beings to be distinguished from Beings.’ I,3.4. He correctly believed that Platonic dialectic is concerned with ‘realities’ (the Forms) and not with ‘words’ (the logic of discursive reasoning). I,3.5. For Plotinus, the hypostasis of Intellect is the site of reason. Intellect makes Soul rational by giving it a copy of what it has. The rational soul is the true man, within.

8. ‘The cultivation of Reason remained at the centre of the Platonic life-style, but non-intellectual elements were now incorporated into the life of the soul, as energising psychic forces on which Reason draws. On the other hand, it also complicated Reason’s struggle for purity. Both aspects of the divided-soul model emerge in the Phaedrus metaphor of the soul as a pair of winged horses, joined together in natural union with their charioteer. One horse is white, noble and easily guided; the other is a dark, crooked, lumbering animal, shag-eared and deaf, hardly yielding to whip and spur.’ G. Lloyd, The Man of Reason, ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy. London: Methuen, 1984, 20. In the Phaedrus, Socrates argues that conflicting desires enables the love of wisdom. ‘The later Plato...thus saw passionate love and desire as the beginning of the soul’s process of liberation through knowledge’. Ibid. 21.  In the Symposium, ‘in Diotima’s version of the lover’s progress Reason does not simply shed the perturbations of passion but assimilates their energising force. Reason itself becomes a passionate faculty and a creative, productive one.’ Ibid. 22. As an example of the function of another non-discursive element, the Republic’s myth of Er exemplifies Plato’s belief in the truth-revealing power of imagination.

9. Phaedrus 247d5ff. Here Plato was referring to the moral Forms. For Plotinus, righteousness is a beautiful ‘active actuality’, like a statue in intellect.

10. ‘“On the other hand, to say that it pays to be just is to say that we ought to say and do all we can to strengthen the man within us...’”. Republic IX, 589a. On his ideal society Plato wrote ‘“Perhaps,” I said, “it is laid up as a pattern in heaven, where he who wishes can see it and found it in his own heart. But it doesn’t matter whether it exists or ever will exist”’. Republic IX, 592b. Plato believed that the Forms are sources of moral and (particularly from the perspective of my thesis) religious inspiration.

11. See, for example: Plotinus. Enneads Trans. A.H. Armstrong. In seven volumes. London: William Heinemann, 1966-1988, vol. V, 25

12. Republic VII, 514-521. Plato argued that we should develop the motion of our (non-discursive) ‘thought’ as much as possible to reflect (restore to likeness with) the motion of the universe and of divine thought. ‘Among movements, the best is that we produce in ourselves of ourselves - for it is most nearly akin to the movement of thought and of the universe...’ Timaeus 47, 89, in Timaeus and Critias. Trans. D. Lee. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977, 120, and ‘There is of course only one way to look after anything and that is to give it its proper food and motions. And the motions that are akin to the divine in us are the thoughts and revolutions of the universe. We should each therefore attend to these motions and by learning about the harmonious circuits of the universe repair the damage done at birth to the circuits in our head, and so restore understanding and what is understood to their original likeness to each other. When that is done we shall have achieved the goal set us by the gods...’ 48, 90, ibid., 121-122.

13. Armstrong described the often obscure Enneads as ‘an unsystematic presentation of a systematic philosophy’. Armstrong, op. cit., vol. I, xv

Saturday, 21 September 2013


Plotinus, Bergson and Cubism: Part Two


In his philosophy, Bergson sought to bring the flow of reality to consciousness as opposed to a succession of changing states. He thought that it is only by an effort that we can overcome our natural practice of taking ‘views’ of reality and apprehending a succession of changing states. Antliff suggests that these multiple views can be interpreted as a Kantian attempt to grasp the thing-in-itself. Bergson however referred to Kant’s thing-in-itself and stated we can know part of reality - ourselves - in our ‘natural purity.’ Even when they are successive, states of consciousness permeate one another ‘and in the simplest of them the whole soul can be reflected’. 

For Bergson, ‘planes of consciousness’ move between the plane of ‘pure’ memory and the plane of action. He believed that between them are thousands of different planes of consciousness. The plane of ‘pure’ memory is the place of dreaming. The plane of action is the plane of ‘motor habits’. He referred to these planes of consciousness as an infinite number of planes of memory. Further, ‘These planes ... exist virtually, with that existence which is proper to things of the spirit’ - ‘pure memory is a spiritual manifestation. With memory we are, in truth, in the domain of spirit.’ 

He thought that there could be a possible interpenetration of human consciousnesses, that two consciousnesses can be united in a single experience, into a single duration, and that intuition possibly opens the way into consciousness in general. Again, he thought that an impersonal consciousness linked our conscious ‘minds’ with all nature. The more conscious we become of our progress in pure duration, the more we press against the future and know freedom.

Bergson referred to duration lifting the soul above the Idea and to a double movement of memory between its two extreme limits, with motor habits ascending to seek similar images, in order to extract resemblances from them, and similar images coming down toward motor habits, to fuse themselves, for instance, in the automatic utterance of the word which makes them one.

His central thesis is that ‘reality’ must be grasped by intuition. Intuition is the immediate non-intellectual knowledge not of discontinuous moments but of the indivisible flow of ‘real’ time, comprising a plurality of multiple aspects and meanings. It is the ability to immediately discern our own inner being as well as the thoughts of others. In apprehending reality in its true duration, we enter into the experience or thing itself. Intuition unites science and metaphysics in ‘the absolute’. It deals with mobility and as I have stated earlier, this mobility applies also to the motionless. Duration, then, is the intuitive apprehension of the passage of spiritual reality.

Intuition enables us to grasp reality directly, not superficially but in depth, unmediated by intellectual apprehension. Through intuition we can probe the meaning and nature of life and of evolution itself. Bergson’s intuition amounts to the same non-discursive contemplation of perfection in ‘mind’ as that advocated by Plotinus. The philosophies of both depend on ‘mind’ being more real than and distinct from,  the senses. 

Bergson believed that such intuitive knowledge could nourish and illuminate everyday life, since the world of our senses is no more than a shadow and is as cold as death. He wrote that a philosophy of intuition will be swept away by the ‘positive’ sciences ‘if it does not resolve to see the life of the body just where it really is, on the road that leads to the life of the spirit.’ Intuition or ‘mind’ introduces us to the unity of spiritual life. Bergson’s intuition amounts to knowledge of the soul in its eternal movement. 

There are two ways to apprehend reality - by the analysis and understanding of partial notations (the way of science) or by the metaphysical intuition of real parts (the way of creation and art). Analysis breaks up duration into static fragmentary concepts and is compelled to move around the object it desires to embrace. Intuition or ‘intellectual sympathy’ probes the flow of duration in its concreteness, by placing one within an object and giving an absolute. Analysis always deals with the immobile and cannot be reconstituted, intuition places itself in mobility and can be reconstituted in consciousness. It is a simple act.

The intellect is bound to misunderstand motion and change, reducing such phenomena to points and instants. It is spatially orientated and unavoidably tends to separate states of ‘mind’. In duration, states of ‘mind’ flow into and interpenetrate each other. Bergson believed that we have almost completely sacrificed intuition to intellect and wanted to develop a philosophy in which intuition subsumed intellect. ‘Intellect leaves us in the darkness of night.’ 

For him, there are two levels of conscious life - ‘a superficial level composed of discrete sensations and separate states and a deeper level where there is no separation but a pure continuity.’ Since mental reality does not exist in space, the intellect, which does and deals with spatiality, cannot grasp it. Mental reality can only be intuited because it lies beyond spatial explanation. Although the intellect can give an increasingly complete account of the material world, it can only offer a reduction of life into terms of mechanics. 

Intuition is the faculty of grasping the pure flow of consciousness before the intellect fragments it into separate states and parts. The space of consciousness is real motion and therefore doesn’t exist between things but in the relations between things and as such is part of duration and the absolute. The intuition of space and direction requires the same geometrisation of nature as the intuition of bodies 

Bergson used the achievements of science to refute the ‘positive sciences’ and to justify his theories. Not only are all atoms interpenetrating, with each atom occupying the whole of gravitational space, the materiality of the atom dissolves further, with the advance of knowledge, to a point where objective matter no longer exists, but force becomes ‘materialised’. This force returns continuity to the universe. He stressed the interpenetration of all things. Although the material world can be extended in space and the mental cannot, they form an absolute interpenetration with no independent parts.

The importance of Bergson’s philosophy to an understanding of the development of abstraction and early twentieth century Modernism cannot be overstated. The similarity in the treatment of form woven into pictorial space in the art of Cubism, Futurism, Orphism, Cubo-Futurism and Rayonnism (Rayism) in particular, find their connection here. 

Creativity was a key concept for Bergson. In his his major work, Creative Evolution,  he discussed his notion of artistic intuition and claimed that the creative urge is at the heart of evolution. He began Time and Free Will with writing on aesthetic feeling. 

While the inner life cannot be represented by either concepts or images, an intuition of duration can be evoked by an image. For this to happen the work of art must not be constructed analytically (since one can only pass from intuition to analysis but not vice versa) but must induce an alogical state of ‘mind’ in the viewer. 

True art is revelation and the artist is ‘this revealing agent.’ The great souls are those of artists and mystics. This is because these people are in  harmony with the inner life of things and can draw us into their experience through their practice.

Every work of art is the result of a process whereby the inner self in its duration is made accessible to others through intuition. Artistic intuition embodies nature’s spiritual essence. Bergson argued for creative action rather than contemplation, yet in his philosophy the two are indistinguishable. The creative product of intuition hopefully persuades the viewer or reader to transcend their daily mental habits and also experience intuition, and these two intuitions co-mingle in inter-subjectivity. While an image cannot replace the intuition of duration, a mix of distinct but balanced elements can work together to stimulate a viewer to make the necessary effort to achieve an intuition.

Artistic practice ‘aims at impressing feelings on us rather than expressing them, it suggests them to us, and willingly dispenses with the imitation of nature when it finds some more efficacious means.’ The artist aims at sharing his emotion with the viewer. Bergson regarded emotion as transcendent. As Deleuze wrote, it ‘is like the God in us.’ This creative emotion is precisely a cosmic Memory that liberates people from ‘mere’ duration in order to make them creators, through whom flow the whole movement of creation.  

The object of art is to put to sleep the resistance of the viewer’s personality (a spiritualised hypnosis), to bring the viewer ‘into a state of perfect responsiveness, in which we realise the idea that is suggested to us and sympathise with the feeling that is expressed.’ To provoke an intuitive response, the elements of the canvas must first arouse the viewer’s emotions and sensitivity to the flow of true duration. This can be achieved in a number of ways. 

Devices include the rhythmical arrangement and effect of line and words. He also gave the example of lettering which are parts of a poem which one knows, but randomly mixed. Because one knows the poem, one can immediately reconstitute the poem as a whole. This is an example of the reconstitution of the real parts of intuition (and metaphysics), distinct from the partial notations of analysis and the positive sciences, which cannot be reconstituted. Negation also affirms and suggests aspects of an object. Another device is the conveyance of the notion of passage. The technique of passage derives from Cézanne, but its philosophical inspiration may well lie in Bergson’s ideas. Again, music speaks to our spirit.

Bergson wrote of flexibility, mobility, ‘almost fluid representations, always ready to mould themselves on the fleeting forms of intuition.’ Evocative of the refined and far more relaxed methods of so-called Synthetic Cubism are Bergson’s words ‘Intuition, bound up to a duration which is growth, perceives in it an uninterrupted continuity of unforeseeable novelty.’ 

But if the philosophy of Bergson had any energy to its élan vital, or any flow to its durée, it did so because it was a pale image and a shadow of a vast structure created by a man of far greater integrity to his purpose and of far greater historical and cultural significance - Plotinus.

In his system set out in the Enneads, a system ‘teeming’, ‘boiling’ and ‘seething’ with creative energy and life (which differs extremely from the general awareness of Platonism and Neoplatonism), are all of the concepts central to the philosophy of Bergson - particularly the relationship between contemplation, movement or flow (Bergson’s durée) and the ultimate goal of oneness achieved through that process of activity in stillness. In that system, set out in the third century A.D., exists the source of Bergson’s multiplicity-in-unity, the same function for intuition, the same aspiration of soul to the Absolute, the same stance on time and space, on extension or absence of extension, the same regard for the creative power of the artist (which Michelangelo responded so powerfully to), the same philosophical desire to reject the material world and to orient his audience to their true, perhaps unconsciously remembered, spiritual purpose.

A study of Plotinus’ work, though difficult, due to Porphyry’s arbitrary editing of his mystical and contradictory writing, sheds much light (as Plotinus might have said) on the philosophy of Bergson. It also has more to offer to an understanding of Cubism. As the Good to all that came after and from it, it is the source.  

Plotinus’ system is built around the three hypostases of the Good, Intellect (or the realm of contemplative thought) and Soul. From the Good, which is absolute unity and which has infinite power, comes an outpouring of creative energy to its Idea - the universe of Intellect (in which exist the Platonic Forms as multiplicity-in-unity), which in turn spawns Soul which has as its purpose the conveyance of the Forms into this universe of invisible matter. In this system, there is a constant duality of movement in contemplation. Each hypostasis produces ‘downwards’ as it strives upwards, longing for its ultimate source. This longing is informed by recollection. 

Everything which is in our universe is in the universe of Intellect, including matter. But whereas the matter here tends to evil and is fragmented in ever changing forms, the matter there exists as multiplicity-in-unity. Plotinus’ world of Forms is an organic living community of interpenetrating beings which are both Forms and intelligences. Everything in the universe of Intellect is not only far more real,  but far more alive than here - the air, the water, the fire. Plotinus emphasised the life and the vital and dynamic nature of spiritual being. Perfection for him is a fullness of living and productive power. The One is an infinite spring of power, an unbounded life, and therefore necessarily productive.

Soul brought Time as ‘the image of eternity’ to this universe (as Plotinus quoted Plato on this point, so Bergson quoted both). It also brought spatial extension to facilitate the division of form. All the souls of this world derive from Intellect where they exist as a unity. Our souls can aspire and move upwards to re-experience this unity. Bergson drew on this notion.

Central to Plotinus’ philosophy, and another distinction between this universe and that which exits beyond it is the notion of sight. The sight which we depend on in this universe becomes another beyond it. It is the inward-looking vision of contemplation of the god within us all. As the contemplation deepens beyond physical activity, the seer becomes the seen.  

Plotinus regarded discursive reasoning (what Bergson called ‘analytic’ reasoning) as belonging to this spatialised universe, and therefore dealing only with parts. He developed Plato’s concept of anamnesis into a central and highly active process in his philosophy. Whilst recognising the importance of the soul’s recollection of its origin, he argued for intuition because he thought that it by-passed self-consciousness and was more effective than memory in the soul’s movement to and through duration. 

Towards this arousal of unconscious memory (distinguishing between ‘memory of’ and ‘reminder of’), Plotinus emphasised the importance of a lover’s desire (the opposite of the lust of this universe) and like Bergson, pointed to partial notation and the role of music in arousing the emotions and a sense of beauty which in turn would recall the source of that beauty in Intellect and ultimately in the Good. Plotinus wrote of the Egyptians’ use of ideogrammatic symbols on temple walls to avoid the use of lettering in evoking the non-discursive reality of the intelligible world. Both Plotinus and Bergson suggested methods of dematerialising our contemplation of the visible cosmos so that we see the intelligible. 

Further, the soul’s ‘image-making power’ shows the intellectual act as if in a mirror, and this is how  there is apprehension of the intellectual act. Even though the soul is always moved to intelligent activity, it is when it comes to be in the image-making power that we apprehend it. Memory belongs to the image-making power.  

On the place of art and the role of the artist, Plotinus was, as elsewhere, contradictory. On the one hand he argued (as did Plato in the Republic) that the work of art was at third remove from its source. On the other, he not only accorded the artist a place as creator, but by implication equated him with the Good and therefore, god. The more successful the artist, the more the viewer of the art object, through contemplation, would be drawn to union with the artist’s creative power.

By writing that Intellect is more intensely active in the gods, Plotinus implied that the more active Intellect is, the closer to the Good. Hence, the more the artist can stimulate activity of soul in the viewer, the closer the viewer will attain to the Good (the artist’s emotional life).

I wish to complete this aspect of my presentation with two quotations - one from Plotinus and one from Bergson. The first quotation is from Ennead III 6 7 (together with Picasso’s Mandolin Player, (n.d.)

Matter, then, is incorporeal ... it is a ghostly image of bulk, a tendency towards substantial existence; it is static without being stable; it is invisible in itself and escapes any attempt to see it, and occurs when one is not looking, but even if you look closely you cannot see it. It always presents opposite appearances on its surface, small and great, less and more, deficient and superabundant, a phantom which does not remain and cannot get away either, for it has no strength for this, since it has not received strength from intellect but is lacking in all being. Whatever announcement it makes, therefore, is a lie, and if it appears great, it is small, if more, it is less; its apparent being is not real, but a sort of fleeting frivolity ... it seems to be filled, and holds nothing; it is all seeming. ‘Imitations of real beings pass into and out of it,’ (Timaeus 50C 4-5) ghosts into a formless ghost, visible because of its formlessness. They seem to act on it, but do nothing, for they are wraith-like and feeble and have no thrust; nor does matter thrust against them, but they go through without making a cut, as if through water, or as if someone in a way projected shapes in the void people talk about ... (Matter is) like things in a dream or water on a mirror ...

The second is from Bergson’s Matter and Memory  

That there is a close connection between a state of consciousness and the brain we do no dispute. But there is also a close connection between a coat and the nail on which it hangs, for if the nail is pulled out, the coat falls to the ground. Shall we say, then, that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of the coat, or in any way corresponds to it? No more are we entitled to conclude, because the physical fact is hung onto a cerebral state, that there is any parallelism between the two series psychical and physiological.

It is my contention that it was very likely to this most fundamental of philosophical issues than a mere play on illusion that the nail in Braque’s Pitcher and Violin 1909-10, referred. As Bergson and Braque would have been aware - a lot hangs on it.
--

16.5.1997

Plotinus, Bergson and Cubism


My presentation is drawn from my research-in-progress investigating the relationship between Neoplatonism and the Cubist aesthetic. Philosophically, my focus is on Bergson and Plotinus whose philosophies, consistent with the development of Platonism after the death of Socrates, were literally reactionary; aesthetically, it is on the founders and leaders of Cubism - Picasso and Braque. It is my contention that it was on the back of Bergson’s philosophy that a set of philosophical ways of thinking with a fundamentally Neoplatonic core were carried into at least a number of the leading art currents in the first two decades of the twentieth century - particularly that of Cubism - itself pivotal to Modernism. The thesis will be an interweaving of these two strands - those of two key contributors to a current in philosophy reaching back nearly two and a half thousand years and of two key contributors to a moment in art.

I have chosen to research this subject for two primary reasons. It is generally agreed that Cubism was a ‘defining moment’ for Modernism - thus any determinations that are arrived at on this subject could fairly be applied in an assessment of other art positioned under the rubric of Modernism.

Again, the great philosophical system of Platonism and its development, Neoplatonism, has provided the ideas and inspiration in thought for creatively interpreting the world that has informed so much of Western visual culture, particularly since the Renaissance. 

The awareness and understanding of the depth of this connection, and even of the connection itself, has substantially been lost, buried, during the course of this century, resulting in the image of formalist analysis replacing the analysis of the substance of Platonic Form and the philosophy structured around it. Whilst the theory is regarded as superseded, the practice (in its origins structured substantially by that theory) continues. This philosophy warrants restating and its influence on our present culture, exploration. The more thoroughly a subject is worked through, the more potential for movement beyond it - notwithstanding the imposition of a mere prefix.

Thus, through an exploration of the nexus between Neoplatonism and Cubism I aim to develop my understanding of this ‘defining moment’ and of Modernism, and to contribute to a removal of the bracken from a winding and very well-worn path.

A connection between Bergson and Cubism though (to my knowledge so far) not acknowledged by Picasso or Braque, was established, urged, by fellow artists and critics of Cubism at that time. This is well documented. There is much circumstantial evidence, however, to argue the point regarding Picasso and Braque - not only with regard to their art, statements, influences and circle, but through a comparative analysis of their work in relation to those who did acknowledge that connection.

Similarly regarding Neoplatonism - not only did it experience a re-vitalisation in the dominant French culture in the last decades of the nineteenth century through Symbolism, it permeated that eclectic philosophical mix - including Bergson’s philosophy -  upon which the Cubists and their circle drew for their justification and inspiration. The literature arguing a connection between Bergson and Cubism and particularly, and far more importantly (given his historical standing), between Plotinus and Cubism is sparse and tends to be very problematic.

Bergson’s name occurs frequently in the literature on Futurism, less so in that on Cubism. In 1993 Robert Antliff produced a book in which he explored the relation between Bergson and Cubism. This is the only book I know of which analysed this connection. Yet Antliff’s writing is exemplary of the confusion and hesitancy of scholarship on this subject. On the one hand he argued that Bergson played a seminal role in shaping the art and politics of the Fauvist, Cubist and Futurist movements, that the first attempts to align Cubist theory with that of Bergson began in about 1912 and that ‘no sustained comparative examination of Cubism’s precepts with those of Bergson has been undertaken thus far’, on the other, he wrote not only that Bergson’s influence on Cubism has remained enigmatic but that his (Antliff’s) question was not whether the progenitors of Cubism and Fauvism invented their art forms in response to Bergson, but how his ideas were received in a pre-existing Fauvist and Cubist milieu. Antliff focused only on the minor Cubists, and much of his book is taken up with the French cultural politics of the period. Antliff did not set out or analyse the relationship between Bergson and the current of Neoplatonism.

Mark Cheetham, in his important book detailing the influence of Platonism/Neoplatonism on the development of early twentieth century abstraction omits discussing Bergson. ‘I do not discuss Bergson, because in spite of his tremendous interest in memory and his influence in modern painting (especially Futurism), he was overtly anti-Platonic in his theorising.’ 

Virginia Spate, in her book on Orphism, made many references to Bergson. She clearly stated the influence on artists by him in the first decades of the twentieth century yet weakened the recognition of that influence by placing it second to the formal lessons the artists drew from their own practice. Further, she did not explore connections she cited between Plato/nism, Neoplatonism and Bergson.

Roger Taylor argued that the Cubism of Picasso and Braque can be considered ‘as a visual art illustrating Bergson’s thesis of decomposition’ and claimed to have found the passage in Bergson’s writing which may have ‘started Cubism’. Yet having made such an important connection - that is, between Bergson and the Cubism of Picasso and Braque, Taylor’s analysis remained at the level of form because he did not base his analysis on the essence of Bergson’s theory - the notion of duration. 

I have stated my differences with the above at this point because for these and similar reasons, I consider a careful re-reading and re-statement of relevant aspects of the philosophies of Bergson and Plotinus to be essential to my project. 

Bergson was one of the most influential and widely read philosophers of the first decades of the twentieth century. His lectures at the College de France (where he was a professor from 1900) were immensely popular with students and wealthy intellectuals. By 1910 he was regarded as a national sage, receiving the Legion d’honneur in 1918 and the Nobel Prize for literature in 1928. His most influential works were written between 1889 (Time and Free Will) and 1907 (Creative Evolution).  Creative Evolution is regarded as Bergson’s most important work and it had a very strong impact when it was published. His epistemology was overtly anti-rational, putting ‘intuition’ in the place of reason. His notion of ‘mind’ was plainly dualist - ‘consciousness does not spring from the brain’.

He thought that existence moves as a flow and not dialectically. Deleuze noted that in this there is a Platonic tone. The implication of Bergson’s philosophy is that he did to Plato what Marx claimed to have done to Hegel, yet his philosophy sought to maintain the development of Platonism standing upright. He opposed his eternity of creative evolution to Plato’s eternity of immutability based on Ideas and wrote that Plato was the ‘first and foremost’ to seek true reality in the unchanging, whereas for him, reality lay precisely in what does change. Yet his eternal and ‘independent reality’ of change derives from the immutable of Plato.

Bergson asked how it is possible, having posited unchanging Ideas, to make change come from them, then argued ‘there is more in the motionless than in the moving’, that Ideas are contained in matter and that nothing, the source of becoming, moves between Ideas, creating ‘endless agitation’. Hence duration coexisted with Ideas. 

He thought that we are all born Platonists and that there exists nothing positive outside Ideas. He gave the example of the Idea of a poem, how thousands of people write on an Idea and how our ‘minds’ can leap from the words to the images and from these to the Idea. In view of the highly philosophic assertions made regarding the nature of Cubism, Bergson’s treatment of form is most important. 

He distinguished between the ‘everyday’, ‘positive’ sciences which are characteristic of the intellect (which for him was discursive), remain ‘external’ to the object with the use of symbols, are restricted to separate moments and giving us a relative, convenient knowledge, and ‘true’ science which is obtained by the ascension to Ideas. This science is metaphysics which supposedly dispenses with symbols, is ‘preformulated’ in nature and is capable of attaining the absolute.

Bergson acknowledged his profound obligation to Plotinus and gave a course of lectures on him at the College de France in 1897-98. The metaphysical vision of Creative Evolution has been compared with that of Plotinus’ Enneads. In Creative Evolution Bergson suggested the possibility of applying the term ‘God’ to the source from which all things flow. In ‘The Two Sources of Morality and Religion’, the primal energy at the heart of the universe is stated to be love. Bergson believed there is a ‘tremendous push’ in nature which unites all nature and carries it along. Creative Evolution is based on élan vital which for Bergson is the actualisation of memory in duration. This élan vital drives life to ‘overcome’ matter. 

As in his theorising about science, Bergson’s dualism is again evident in his treatment of the concepts ‘time’ and ‘duration’ (durée) which are fundamental to his philosophy. There is ‘intellectual’ time - that which can be subject to analysis and ‘real’ time - the time of ‘psychological’ experience. There is ‘mere’ duration - the general flow in time of all things (‘the phantom of duration’ ) and ‘pure’ duration, the non-material basis and origin of all things. It is dynamic, creative and irreversible. Most commentators on Bergson incorrectly recognise only one of the two durations - the ‘true’ or ‘inner’ duration.

Knowledge of duration can only be obtained by intuition - a direct, non-conceptual perception in which the act of knowing coincides with the person, experience or object in duration. Duration cannot be ‘spatialised’ i.e. divided into units. According to Bergson we do break movement, and change it into simultaneous moments in order to act. It is in our ‘inner’ life that the reality of change is revealed as indivisible, and it is this indivisible continuity of change which constitutes true duration. ‘Real’ time and ‘true’ duration are the same.

Bergson criticised Plato and Plotinus for turning away from practical life, for  ‘escaping’ change and raising themselves above time, but this is precisely what he did when he distinguished between time of the ‘intellect’ and time of the immaterial ‘mind’. This ‘succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines’ is the site of Neoplatonic reality. Bergson wrote ’(Plato) in his magnificent language ... says that God, unable to make the world eternal, gave it Time, “a moving image of eternity.”’ The Time referred to here is ‘intellectual’ time, the ‘eternity’ is Bergson’s ‘real’ psychological time or ‘pure’ duration. Bergson regarded duration and consciousness as inseparable. Inner duration is perceived by consciousness and ‘is nothing else but the melting of states of consciousness into one another.’

He equated consciousness with memory. Hence duration is essentially ‘conscious’ memory. In duration, there is no distinction between the present and the past and the emotions are paramount, enabling the addition to a present feeling of the memory of past moments. For Bergson, there are different types of memory - memory applicable to daily existence (perception, ‘motor habits’, impulse) and memory attuned with the past (recollection). True memory is not a function of the brain but is independent of matter and ‘there is not merely a difference of degree, but of kind, between perception and recollection.’ The brain is only an intermediary between sensation and duration - ‘in no case can the brain  store up recollections or images’. 

Memory is a synthesis of past and present with a view to the future and duration is resistant to law and measurement. Our perceptions are infused with memories and our memories are activated by what we see - these two complimentary memories - one physical, the other non-physical - insert themselves each into the other. Not only do our different types of memory interpenetrate and interact in duration,  ‘there are always some dominant memories, shining points round which the others form a vague nebulosity.’ 

For Bergson, the synthesis performed by our consciousness of what is and what was, results in a permeation, completion and continuation. Bergson held that change is the essence of life, that states of being do not exist distinct from each other, but as an endless flow. But the change of which he wrote takes place not in objective reality but in the duration of ‘mind’. This change applies even to a motionless object.

Change and duration need to be grasped in their mobility, we need to recapture this essence of reality by moving back into duration. Bergson’s dualism is again apparent in his notion of reality - that it is both external and given immediately to the ‘mind’ - the latter being the reality of duration.

In our perception he thought that we take ‘snapshots’ or ‘instantaneous views’ of flowing reality which we join together to give the appearance of becoming. He compared this with cinematography (‘the cinematographical instinct of our thought’). These solid points of support are necessary for living and for ‘positive’ science. They allow the essence of reality to escape. 

Bergson argued that the elements of the spatial world are perpetually simultaneous with duration, whereas consciousness is pure duration and its states cannot be adequately represented as being extended in space. Objects in the material world are mutually external and only succeed each other in so far as they are remembered as doing so by an observer. Simultaneity is a thing of space and the external world, duration exists in the flow of memory.

In its passage from what has been to what is, memory binds together and constitutes inner duration. Without the survival of the past in the present, there can only be a sequence of separate moments. In reality, the body has no form (since form is immobile) and is changing constantly. Form can only be an instantaneous view of change. 

The above may appear to contradict my thesis that Bergsonism was an adaptation of Platonism and Neoplatonism. However, not only did Bergson use Neoplatonic terminology, and do so in contradictory ways, his maintenance of the relationship between eternal truth (as duration) and appearance (as snapshots of that truth), and of the way by which that truth can be attained (through contemplative intuition) derives from a Platonic and Neoplatonic heritage.

Bergson argued that an accumulation of points of view place one outside the subject and that the only way of attaining the subject’s essence (the absolute, perfection) would be by coinciding internally with the subject, by placing oneself within it. By entering it we attain absolute knowledge, by moving around it and remaining on its exterior we can acquire only relative knowledge.Through entering and identifying with the original, we become it.

Part I/To be continued ...